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One World with Zain Asher
Senate Select Intelligence Committee Hearing To Examine Worldwide Threats. Aired 11a-12p ET
Aired March 25, 2025 - 11:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[11:00:00]
SEN. RON WYDEN (D-OR): Yeah, and I just think it's important to follow through here. Would the two of you cooperate with an audit to confirm that
that is the case?
TULSI GABBARD, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, : I have no objection.
JOHN RATCLIFFE, DIRECTOR, CIA: Senator, I'll certainly comply with any follow-up that the National Security Council would deem appropriate. But
again, to be clear, the use of signal message and end-to-end encryption applications is permissible and was, in this case used permissibly, at
least to my understanding, and in a lawful manner.
WYDEN: The seriousness of this is so clear. That's why I want to have an audit, and both of you gave me an answer indicating that you would be open
to that, and I appreciate it.
Director Patel, you weren't in this particular group chat, but have you participated in any chats on unclassified phones with other administration
officials relating to national security? And if so, on what other topics?
KAH PATEL, DIRECTOR, FBI: Thank you. Thank you for your question, Senator, and not that I can recall.
WYDEN: OK. A question I have for you, Director Gabbard, involves this question of Elon Musk wasn't going to see the military's China war plans,
because he said, he quote, "has business in China and he would be susceptible perhaps to that." That was his comment.
So as DNI, you're responsible for security clearance policies across the government. Under your watch, how are you going to go about carrying out
this obligation? Because I think it obviously is a very significant one in terms of American national security.
RATCLIFFE: Thank you, Senator. As you know, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence provides oversight over these different 18
intelligence elements. Leaders within those elements are empowered with that responsibility to uphold the trust that the American people have
placed in them.
In this example that you've cited, both Secretary Hegseth as well as President Trump completely denied the assertion that Elon Musk was going to
receive any kind of classified war plan brief pertaining to China or any other country.
WYDEN: So on the question of whether the President has the prerogative to get clearances is really the area that I want to touch on, because you are
formally responsible for security clearance policies, and that's why I'm asking about it. So can a President decide who gets the clearance?
RATCLIFFE: Yes.
WYDEN: So what about your role? You're formally responsible for security clearance policies.
RATCLIFFE: That is also true.
WYDEN: So how do we resolve it? The President just gets his way.
RATCLIFFE: The elected President and Commander-in-Chief has the authority to provide a security clearance to those who he deems necessary.
WYDEN: Mr. Chairman and to the Ranking Member, I think we have to have a further discussion on this and figure out what the ground rules are. I
think it's clear what the Director says. I just think we need more clarity, because I think you have the formal responsibility for security clearances,
and now we've heard that this somehow is going to be the President's project, and I think we ought to have further discussions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
COTTON: Senator Lankford.
LANKFORD: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all of you and your service to the country. It matters. There are a lot of citizens of our country
right now that have much greater security in their life because of the work that you do and the people that are working around you do. So I just want
to say I appreciate that. For the folks in Oklahoma, they would definitely want me to be able to say thank you for your service.
Let me let me ask a couple of questions. Director Gabbard, let me start with you on this. Iran has been listed as one of the top sponsors of
terrorism for a very long time. This is -- they're the primary armors of Hezbollah of Hamas of the Houthis. They are arming the Russians to be able
to kill Ukrainians.
They continue to be able to destabilize the region. And just in the recent days, when many nations in the Gulf region have talked about how to provide
greater stability, Iranian leadership stepped out and made very clear statements. They want a one state solution for Israel and this is to drive
out all Jews. So this continues to be an issue not just for the region, but for Americans in particular.
So my question is on this, is the sanctions and the effect of sanctions, what we know about the Iranian response under the Biden administration,
those sanctions were turned down where, quite frankly, Iran has been able to sell $90 billion in oil on the global market to be able to rearm itself
and all the others around the region. Now, sanctions are now going back on to Iran again. What do we know about the effect of those sanctions?
[11:04:48]
GABBARD: Thank you, Senator, for the question. These sanctions have just begun to be reinstated, so the full effects are not yet -- have not yet
borne fruit. But the message that the president has sent with his maximum pressure campaign is certainly heard.
As the Chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, President Trump recently sent a letter to the leader of Iran expressing his interest in direct talks
in order to try to de-escalate and to prevent war, prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon, but also stated that there would be military
consequences if there was no direct negotiations.
So President Trump is continuing to carry out his vision and mission of peace through strength, acting in the best interests of the American
people. We will see what choices are made from here.
LANKFORD: OK, thank you. Director Patel, during the last administration and the very open border policy that they had, we had some years, including
2022 and 2023, where there were 70,000 individuals that were released into the country that were identified as special interest aliens. This is
something this committee and the Homeland Security Committee tried over and over again to get details on. The Biden administration was unwilling to be
able to share any of the details in the special interest aliens, which led to a great amount of frustration.
The comment came often back to us, is that FBI is going to track all these individuals and to be able to identify them, even though it was 70,000 a
year that were coming into the country.
You just walked into this position and trying to get your feet on the ground in so many different issues that are outstanding on that. I raised
to you the issue of individuals that are currently illegally present in the country going through a process, but are listed as special interest aliens
by definition from the administration. Those are individuals that we don't know their level of risk, but where they are considered a national security
risk. But we don't know anything else about them from there.
So how are you trying to get on top of the number of people that are criminal aliens in the country, but also these special interest aliens that
come from terrorist areas?
PATEL: Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your question. As far as the FBI is concerned, you hit on it, criminal.
So we are focused across our interagency partners at DHS, ICBP, CIS and elsewhere to identify through our information sharing networks that we have
stood up with state and local law enforcement to provide us the details on any criminal evidence relating to any of the individuals you highlighted.
And if there's a nexus there, a case will be open, excuse me, by the line agents who predicated lawful and factual basis to do so, and we will
further refer that matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution. We are reviewing all of these cases anew and we will report back to you
senator with some fidelity on the outcome of that process.
LANKFORD: OK, thank you. Are you getting good feedback from social media technology companies and cooperation from them on illegal activities that
are promoted on their site. All the different sites have rules and standards for what can and can't be done on that, but for instance in the
border areas, many of the sites are allowing child trafficking or they are allowing, basically, the hiring of Americans to come be drivers and such,
and they know this is being circumvented are they working with you on that to be able to take illegal content off their sites.
PATEL: Thank you senator and we have engaged directly at the top levels of all the private sector software communities and social media companies, and
they have been very helpful, because they have known, they have been told that this is a priority for me at the FBI to work with them, because they
have so much information to share back with us. Now that's of course just on the public systems, we're not talking about the dark net.
LANKFORD: Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
COTTON: Senator Heinrich.
HEINRICH: Thank you, Chairman. Director Ratcliffe, I want to start with you. Who determined that the content of this discussion on signal was not
classified?
RATCLIFFE: Senator, I guess I'm not -- well for example, I can speak to my personal knowledge, that there's no classified.
HEINRICH: There was no classified agent mentioned as part of this story. Normally that would be classified information. So I guess what I'm asking,
actually, did you just determine it was not classified or was there any declassification after the fact?
RATCLIFFE: So to be clear, so everyone understands the process. As we talked about signal as a permissible use, I understand that the CIA has
been approved by the White House for senior officials and appropriate for many conversations and recommended by CISA for high-level officials who
would be targeted by foreign adversaries to use end-to-end encrypted apps whenever possible, like signal.
In this case what the National Security Advisor did was to request through a signal message that there be coordination. So you mentioned the name of a
CIA active officer, correct?
HEINRICH: I didn't mention the name. I mentioned the existence of that.
RATCLIFFE: You didn't mention the name, and in the article the implication was that somehow that was improper, that was not the case.
[11:10:03]
So a CIA officer was not operating undercover, so the request for coordination was for a staff member to coordinate on the high side. So I
communicated the name of a CIA officer, not operating undercover, completely appropriate, who does openly and routinely coordinate with the
White House as a member of my staff. So the intimation there that there was something inappropriate was clearly incorrect.
HEINRICH: Did it occur to you that that given the sensitive nature of this discussion, that it could just move to the high side?
PATEL: So that was clearly senator, I think, the intent was that this was initially set up by the National Security Advisor with the instruction,
that send a point of contact, and then you will be provided with information further on the high side, for high side communications. So I
think clearly it reflects that the National Security Advisor intended this to be as it should have been, a mechanism for coordinating between senior-
level officials, but not a substitute for using high side or classified communications for anything that would be classified, and I think that that
is exactly what did happen.
HEINRICH: So I'm curious, did this conversation at some point include information on weapons packages, targets or timing?
PATEL: Not that I'm aware of.
HEINRICH: Director Gabbard, same question.
GABBARD: Same answer and defer to the Department of Defense on that question.
HEINRICH: Those are two different answers, but you are saying that did not -- that was not part of the conversation?
GABBARD: That's my knowledge.
HEINRICH: Precise operational issues were not part of this conversation?
GABBARD: Correct.
HEINRICH: OK. I want to ask you, Director Gabbard, something on a very different track here, which is, I very much agree with the conclusion of
the ATA, that foreign illicit drug actors are a major threat in the United States, and many of you have spoken to this today. Is the IC wrong in its
omission of Canada as a source of illicit fentanyl in the ATA? I was surprised given some of the rhetoric that there is no mention of Canada in
the ATA.
GABBARD: Senator, the focus in my opening and the ATA was really to focus on the most extreme threats in that area, and our assessment is that the
most extreme threat related to fentanyl continues to come from and through Mexico.
HEINRICH: So the President has stated that the fentanyl coming through Canada is massive and actually said it was an unusual and extraordinary
threat, and that was the language that was used to justify putting tariffs on Canada. I'm just trying to reconcile those two issues. Is it an unusual
and extraordinary threat or is it a minor threat that doesn't even merit mention in the annual threat assessment?
GABBARD: Senator, I don't have the numbers related to Canada in front of me at this time. I'd like to get back to you on the specifics of that answer.
HEINRICH: It's less than 1 percent of the fentanyl that we are able to interdict. But if you have different information, I would very much welcome
that.
COTTON: Senator Budd.
BUDD: Thank you all for being here. Director Gabbard, prior to your role here, we had a big storm in Western North Carolina and you were among those
first from outside our state to show up. So thank you for your work there. Thank you for your ongoing work there and that of your family as well. It
was good to see them when out in Western North Carolina last week. So thank you.
Director Haugh, so what do we need to do in regards to Volt Typhoon? There's a lot of pre-positioning that went on there. So where are we with
that and what do we need to do in regards to our power companies, whether it's generation or distribution, Duke Energy in my home state, or even the
rural electric co-ops? What do we need -- what have we learned and what can I tell them?
HAUGH: Senator, 99 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is controlled by private companies. So that really drives us to talk
about how do we partner with industry and with the commercial sector, in this case the power sector.
[11:14:57]
Volt Typhoon began when industry came to the intelligence community and said, we're seeing anomalous activity. Can you help us gain context? And we
were able to bring context to that, to be able to understand what the threat was, and then to ultimately be able to identify who was behind that
threat. Since that time, we've continued to work very closely with industry, to be able to determine what are the right ways for us to be able
to pursue these threats within networks, to enable the interagency, to enable our partners and industry to be able to pursue them. That's the
approach we have to take.
It is a collaboration between the government and industry to be able to eradicate these threats, and we have continued to pursue them together
since our first identification and notification that we did related to this particular threat.
BUDD: Thank you. What have you done on the offensive side here in regards to, I think there were three; Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon, and even Flax
Typhoon. Maybe there were others, but those are the three that are known.
HAUGH: Senator, I've been given really clear guidance in terms of what the Secretary of Defense expects in terms of our aggressive approach to be able
to restore deterrence, and I look forward to talking with you about that in the closed hearing.
BUDD: Look forward to that. Director Gabbard and Ratcliffe and Patel, thank you all again for being here. So as you're all keenly aware, Section 702 of
FISA is an extremely useful authority to help keep our nation safe. I also know that we need to rebuild American people's trust and confidence that
such authorities are not being misused by the intelligence community to unlawfully target Americans.
So since taking over your respective agencies, can you tell me and tell the American people how effective the recent changes have been in protecting
privacy and civil liberties of each and every Americans. And then if you will, comment on how useful the authority is in generating intelligence
that actually protects the homeland. We'll start with you, Director Gabbard.
GABBARD: Senator, Section 702, which authorizes the foreign collection of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States, continues to be one of our
most effective collection tools to ensure our national security. There are a number of reforms that the Senate passed, that Congress passed last year,
that have proven to strengthen the protections of Americans' Fourth Amendment rights.
In the short time that I've been in the seat, I've seen a few examples of that directly. Most recently, through the FISA court, calling in an amici
to come in and weigh in on a dispute regarding provisions that would further protect Americans' Fourth Amendment rights.
I'll be visiting our friends at the NSA next week and doing a "ride-along," to observe directly, how those reforms that Congress passed are being
implemented to protect Americans' civil liberties, and look forward to reporting back after I've had that opportunity.
BUDD: Thank you. Director Patel.
PATEL: Thank you, Senator. With my background in FISA and 702, I just want to clearly delineate between FISA Title I, III, and 702 collection. We need
to both ardently defend its use, but also ardently support reforms that allow the American public to entrust that those charged with those
capabilities are not violating the Fourth Amendment or any other violation.
Speaking to Title I, Title III, when it comes to U.S. persons, I have already included an amendment, in terms of FBI language, to make sure that
when a U.S. person is targeted, that the FBI specifically is responsible for calling through all exculpatory information that is reasonably known
and satisfying that burden and stating it in the application.
PATEL: When it comes to 702, Senator, some of the biggest enterprise efforts we have had to thwart national security risk would not have
occurred if 702 collection had gone dark, and the FBI continues to use that information to protect the homeland. We've had multiple takedowns in the
last six months based on 702 and interagency collection processes, but we just need to ensure the American public, and I'm working with my team, that
even in the 702 sphere, American citizens' information is protected.
BUDD: Thank you all. I'll look forward to the discussion in the closed session.
COTTON: Senator King?
KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, I didn't intend to get into the Jeffrey Goldberg story but something you said has sort of puzzled
me. According to open source reporting, at 11:44 on the morning of March 15th, Secretary Hegseth put into this group text a detailed operation plan
including targets, the weapons we were going to be using, attack sequences, and timing, and yet you've testified that the -- nothing in that -- in that
chain was classified.
[11:20:08]
Wouldn't that be classified? What if that had been made public that morning, before the attack took place?
GABBARD: Senator, I can attest to the fact that there were no classified or intelligence equities that were included in that chat group at any time.
And I -- I...
(CROSSTALK)
KING: ... so the attack sequencing and timing and weapons and targets, you -- you don't consider to have -- should have been classified?
GABBARD: I defer to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council on that question.
KING: Well, you're the head of -- you -- you -- you're the head of the Intelligence Community and you're supposed to know about classifications.
So your testimony very clearly today is that nothing was in that set of texts that were classified. I'll follow up on Senator Wyden's question. If
that's the case, please release that whole text stream so that the public can -- can have a -- a -- a view of what actually transpired on this -- on
this discussion. It's hard for me to believe that targets and timing and weapons would not have been classified.
Well, let me -- let me move on. You approved this report -- this annual report prepared by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Is
this submitted to the White House routinely, in -- in a -- in anticipation of its public release?
GABBARD: I -- I don't know what you mean by submitted routinely.
KING: Was it -- well, was it -- was this report submitted to the White House before its release today?
GABBARD: It was submitted to them once it was completed. I think probably around the same time it was sent to all of you.
KING: I -- I want to move on. One note that surprised me. I've been on this committee now for -- this is my 13th year. Every single one of these
reports that we have had has mentioned global climate change as a significant national security threat except this one. Has something
happened? Has global climate change been solved? Why -- why is that not in this report? And did -- who made the decision that it should not be in the
report when it's been every -- in every one of the 11 prior reports?
GABBARD: I can't speak to the decisions made previously, but this annual threat assessment has been focused very directly on the threats that we
deem most critical to the United States and our national security. Obviously, we're aware of occurrences within the environment and how they
may impact operations, but we're focused on the direct threats...
(CROSSTALK)
KING: ... about how they will impact...
GABBARD: ... safety, wellbeing, and security.
KING: How about how they will impact mass migration, famine, dislocation, political violence, which is the finding, by the way, of the 2019 annual
threat assessment under the first Trump administration? Do you -- you don't consider that a -- a -- a significant national security threat?
GABBARD: For the Intelligence Community, being aware of -- of the environment that we're operating in is a given. What I focused this annual
threat assessment on and the IC focused this threat assessment on are the most extreme and critical direct threats to our national security.
KING: Let me ask you a direct question -- who decided climate change should be left out of this report after it's been in the prior 11? Where was that
decision made?
GABBARD: I -- I gave direction to our team at ODNI to focus on the most extreme and critical national security threats...
KING: Did your direction include no comments on climate change?
GABBARD: Senator, as I said, I focused on the most extreme and direct national...
KING: That's not a response to my question. Did you -- did you instruct that there be no -- there -- no finding in terms of climate change in this
report?
GABBARD: I don't recall giving that instruction.
KING: The final questions in a -- in a few short seconds that I have left. You all concede, and -- and it's in the report repeatedly, about the cyber
danger from China, from Russia, from Iran. Why then is the administration deconstructing CISA? 130 people fired. The -- General Haugh talked about
the importance of public/private cooperation. That -- that section of CISA seems to have been dis-established.
What possible policy reason is there for undermining CISA's relationship to the states with regard to elections -- elections and to the private sector
with regard to cybersecurity when the cybersecurity threat is only growing? Anybody want to tackle that?
GABBARD: I -- I won't speak for all of my colleagues here, but I don't believe any of us have any insight into those specific staffing decisions
that have been made.
KING: Well, let me ask you this question. You have all file -- the -- the - - the report has found explicitly cyber -- growing cyber threats, including to elections, from Russia, China, Iran. Do you believe that it's in the
national interests to diminish our capacity to deal with those cyber issues, yes or no?
[11:25:00]
GABBARD: President Trump is focused on effects and making sure that the people that we have and the resources that we have are focused on our
national security. He and his team recognize that more people doesn't necessarily always mean better effects. Those are some of the things that
are driving the changes that we're seeing across the administration, is getting all of our agencies back and focused on their core mission.
KING: General Haugh, do you agree that...
(CROSSTALK)
KING: Thank you.
COTTON: Senator Rounds?
ROUNDS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank you to all of you for your service to our country.
With regard to the issues surrounding Signal, I am going to address it but I'm going to address it in the closed session so that we can get more in-
depth into that issue.
In the meantime, I -- I want to direct my first question to Director Ratcliffe. As the debate continues in Washington regarding spectrum, what
can you share in this unclassified setting regarding the critical nature of spectrum to national security interests generally?
RATCLIFFE: Thanks for the question, Senator. I know this is an interest -- an issue of great interest to the Senate, and the potential auction of
commercial space on spectrum. Those -- as you correctly point out, the discussions about spectrum, I -- I will start out by saying there are
national security implications from such an auction -- were to take -- to take place to both the DOD and the IC.
I think the discussions that -- that we need to have in a classified setting -- I can relate to you that the direction from early meetings that
we've had is that the discussion about where that might take place would not affect specifically CIA or IC equities.
And I hope that's the case and where the discussion goes, but I think we need to be concerned that a public auction at bands at certain levels would
have an impact on our ability to deliver an accurate intelligence picture.
ROUNDS: In other words, there are parts of the spectrum which simply cannot be shared with the commercial...
RATCLIFFE: That's correct.
ROUNDS: All right, thank you.
RATCLIFFE: And we can talk about the specific reasons about why in a classified setting, that would cause a diminishment of our ability to
deliver a good threat picture to the Commander in Chief.
ROUNDS: And in some cases, life or death consequences.
RATCLIFFE: Absolutely.
ROUNDS: Thank you.
Director Patel, first of all, I just want to thank you for what you are doing. And I know that there's a number of items that in your previous life
you did that simply can't be discussed. But nonetheless, we've appreciated what you have done for your country already. Today I just wanted to talk to
you about, we've seen a series of public news reports about ISIS threats within the United States.
And there have been several successful interdictions. Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, New York. Although the question remains as to the total
number of ISIS operatives who were able to breach porous borders in the months and years before policy changes in this January, January of 2025. To
what extent is the FBI tracking operatives who remain in the United States today? And what is the FBI doing to track them down?
PATEL: Thank you, Senator Vance. I appreciate your question and your comments. So, the priorities that the FBI since I took over have been
violent crime and national security. And this speaks directly to national security. The direction for the FBI is to track down any individuals with
any terrorist ties whatsoever, whether it be ISIS or another foreign terrorist organization. And now to include the new designations of the
cartels, down south and elsewhere.
So, the FBI is utilizing our Joint Terrorism Task Force, which are situated in all 55 field offices. But the key to success there is our partnership
with state and local law enforcement who have the ground level intelligence on some of these operatives. And as you've highlighted, we've already shut
down numerous threats, and we've identified publicly where permissible these threats and individuals and where they're coming from.
And I think the FBI is doing a very good job right now in collecting this information through our interagency process. And we will continue to thwart
every bad actor affiliated with a terrorist organization or otherwise.
ROUNDS: Thank you. And Director Haugh, first of all, you've talked a little bit about already about Salt Typhoon, but what I want to really get into is
is the things that are moving right now that you haven't had a chance to address, and in particular, CYBERCOM 2.0 and the need to accelerate that
particular plan moving forward. Can you talk just briefly? I've got 40 seconds left. Talk to us a little bit about how critical 2.0 is in terms of
countering the cyber activity that's going on through nefarious actors.
[11:30:03]
HAUGH: Senator, what we were asked to do by Congress was to look at what's the fourth generation model for the Department of Defense to be able to
generate cyber forces? Based off of that request, I produced the recommendation for the Secretary that outlined three critical things, which
is really how we manage the talent, how we develop the talent in the department, and also how we equip that talent, underpinned by compute and
AI. We've brought that plan initially back to Secretary Hegseth. He told us to go faster. We've delivered him that plan, and now, based off of his
guidance, we will now begin to move forward with the rest of the department.
ROUNDS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COTTON: Senator Bennet.
BENNET: Thank you, Mr. Chairman Thank you very much for holding this hearing. And thank you for being here. Mr. Director Ratcliffe, it sounds to
me like your testimony today in the sector and the DNI's testimony is that there was nothing wrong at all with the signal thread that you were on.
That it didn't include any targeting information or battle sequence. That that is your testimony. That's your testimony. And I'm a little staggered
that that is your view, Director Ratcliffe. Does the CIA have any rules about handling of classified information? Yes or no?
RATCLIFFE: Yes.
BENNET: Thank you. Director Ratcliffe, do you agree, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said this morning when asked by members of the press, what had
happened, he said this morning in Hawaii that Atlantic Editor in Chief Jeff Goldberg is a, quote, deceitful and highly discredited so called journalist
who's made a profession of providing hoaxes time and time again. Do you share that evaluation, the Secretary of Defense's evaluation of Jeff
Goldberg as a journalist?
RATCLIFFE: Senator, I didn't see those comments. I don't know Jeff Goldberg.
BENNET: So, do you share that view of the Secretary of Defense?
RATCLIFFE: Well, I don't have a view on...
BENNET: OK. Do you -- Do you, assuming that he has that view, I'm curious about whether, you are the CIA director. OK? This has happened. We know
it's happened. Did Jeff Goldberg somehow, was it a -- did he create a hoax that allowed him to become part of this Signal thread? Please answer the
question. You don't -- don't -- don't insult the intelligence of the American people. Did he invite himself to the Signal thread?
RATCLIFFE: I don't know how he was invited, but clearly...
BENNET: Was he (ph) not added? Clearly it was. Finish your sentence please.
RATCLIFFE: Clearly he was added to the Signal group. Your question is...
BENNET: So, you don't know that the President's national security advisor invited him to join the Signal thread? Everybody in America knows that.
Does the CIA director not know that?
RATCLIFFE: I've seen conflicting reports about who added the reporter to the Signal messaging group.
BENNET: It's perfectly appropriate that there was a reporter at it. Especially one that the Secretary of Defense says is deceitful, highly
discredited. A so-called journalist who's made a profession of peddling hoaxes over and over again. Do you -- Is your testimony that it was
appropriate that he was added to this Signal thread?
RATCLIFFE: No, of course not. And Senator...
BENNET: Why did you not call...
RATCLIFFE: Hold on, Senator, you are mischaracterizing my testimony...
BENNET: You are the CIA -- No, you answered -- You answered -- You answered the question. Let me ask you, when he was added to the thread, you're the
CIA Director. Why didn't you call out that his -- he was present on the Signal thread?
RATCLIFFE: I don't know if you use Signal messaging app.
BENNET: I do. I do, not for classified information. Not for targeting...
RATCLIFFE: Neither do I, Senator.
BENNET: Not for anything remote (ph)...
RATCLIFFE: Neither do I, Senator.
BENNET: Well, it competes (ph) with your testimony today.
RATCLIFFE: It absolutely is not, Senator, were you not listening at the beginning when I said that I was using it as permitted, it is permissible
to use...
BENNET: I agree that's your testimony. I agree that's your testimony. You asked me if I use it and I said not for targeting, not for classified
information.
RATCLIFFE: And I said I don't either.
BENNET: I also know Jeff Goldberg. I don't use it to communicate with him, but you thought it was appropriate, by the way I think he's one of the more
outstanding journalists in America, but I'm shocked to find him on a thread that he's reading in the parking lot of a grocery store in Washington D.C.
and your testimony as the director of the CIA is that it's totally appropriate. Is it appropriate that the president...
[11:35:02]
RATCLIFFE: No, that is not what I...
BENNET: OK, go ahead, please.
RATCLIFFE: When did I say it was -- When did I use the word appropriate?
BENNET: Well, go ahead please.
RATCLIFFE: Well, I didn't.
BENNET: That everybody in America...
RATCLIFFE: Clearly, Senator...
BENNET: There's nothing to see here is what your testimony is.
RATCLIFFE: No, I never said that.
BENNET: This is just a normal day at the CIA where we chat about this kind of stuff over Signal, in fact it's so normal that the last administration
left it here for us. That's your testimony today.
RATCLIFFE: That's your testimony.
BENNET: No, that's not my testimony. That's what you said.
RATCLIFFE: I didn't say any of those things that you just relayed (ph), Senator.
BENNET: I heard you say it, we'll let the American people decide. Let me ask you one final point. I'm out of time.
RATCLIFFE: Well, I think you mischaracterized it. Well, are you going to give me a chance to...
BENNET: Is it appropriate? Did you know that the President's Middle East advisor was in Moscow on this thread while you were as Director of the CIA
participating in this thread? Were you aware of that? Are you aware of that today?
RATCLIFFE: I'm not aware of that today. This sloppiness, this incompetence, this disrespect for our intelligence agencies and the personnel who work
for him is entirely unacceptable. It's an embarrassment.
RATCLIFFE: Senator?
BENNET: You need to do better. You need to do better. Thank you. I'm being gaveled by the Chairman, and I apologize for over -- going over my time.
COTTON: Senator Young.
YOUNG: Thank you all for being here. I'll be asking some follow up questions, clarifications about this Signal episode in a closed setting and
try and work with all of you to bring clarity to that situation. It appears to me there's some unanswered questions. It'll take some time, I think to
get there in a more dispassionate setting. Director Gabbard, I'm going to begin today, asking you some questions about emerging technologies. Been a
real point of emphasis. I know of our broader national security community for a period of time. We know that PRC is making generational investments
in certain emerging tech, AI, biotech and other areas of technology to reduce their vulnerability against any supply chain disruptions and to lead
the world in some areas.
As the IC assesses, the PRC is seeking to, quote, become a global S&T superpower, surpass the United States, promote self-reliance and achieve
further economic, political and military gain. So, Director Gabbard, can you describe the actions China is taking to operationalize that IC
assessment in ways that directly target the security and prosperity of everyday Americans?
GABBARD: Senator, what we know is that they are trying to use these capabilities as a means to continue to exploit vulnerabilities within our
own critical infrastructure and our cyber technology. Critical infrastructure is a key area of concern given what we know has already been
exploited. These asymmetric attacks that have been placed within our critical infrastructure, that are of serious concern given how they could
be exploited, especially during a time of conflict.
We know that they are experiencing a boom in their generative AI capability, and are competing very heavily against our own AI capabilities.
Obviously, AI can and will be used across a multitude of every sector of our society, both here as we are in our own country. And we expect China to
be able to continue to do the same there.
YOUNG: So, two key areas of vulnerability to the United States conceivably, susceptibility to cyber attacks, and as China's leveraging of AI towards
misinformation increasingly into the physical realm, they can pose threats to us as well. As follow up, Director Ratcliffe, you know, we've had
Huawei, we've had TikTok, what do you believe will be the next point of technological friction in competition between the U.S. And China? What
should members of Congress be looking for?
RATCLIFFE: Senator, I think I can answer this question more fully in the classified setting. What I would say is it relates to the issue of emerging
technologies and matters of quantum computing and quantum sensing, and our ability to stay ahead of China on the technological curve with respect to
those issues. I'd be happy to get into that in further detail in a classified setting.
[11:40:17]
YOUNG: Excellent. We'll dive into that. Director Haugh, General, how do you see biotech playing into this broader competition?
HAUGH: I think it's an area that, from our perspective, has increasingly been a priority as we want to understand the approach that China has taken
and also to ensure that as we think about the President's priorities in terms of both economic and technology security, we are certainly, as a
community, following DNI's guidance, that we are increasingly putting our resources to be able to ensure that we understand where China is investing
in those resources and how that will impact our economy and overall the overall health of our national security.
YOUNG: Thank you, General. Director Gabbard, not a lot of time left on this end, but I do have a little crypto interest I wanted to communicate to you.
Can you share with this committee how we're positioned to disrupt foreign cyber efforts to steal cryptocurrency such as the North Koreans have
successfully done. If others would like to pull this thread and weigh in on this question, very briefly, that would be great.
GABBARD: Senator, we're obviously aware of North Korea's revenue generating by stealing. Cryptocurrency has had a significant effect on North Korea's
capabilities. I defer to our technical experts on the actions that are being taken.
HAUGH: Senator, I think this would be a great topic when we go to closed.
YOUNG: It's going to be a busy close setting.
(UNKNOWN): Yes.
YOUNG: Director Patel?
PATEL: I agree with the General. In closed session, I can provide some details.
YOUNG: It's what you get when you visit with a bunch of spies. All right, Chairman.
COTTON: Senator Kelly.
KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to come back to the topic of the day here. The Signal chain, as reported by The Atlantic. Ms. Gabbard and
Mr. Ratcliffe, you each testified that there was no information operational in nature, no classified information. So, I want to ask each of you, just a
series of -- just respond yes or no. I'll start with Ms. Gabbard. In the Signal chain that we have been talking about, was there any mention of a
target in Yemen?
GABBARD: I don't remember mention of specific targets.
KELLY: Any generic target?
GABBARD: I believe there was discussion around targets in general.
KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe?
RATCLIFFE: I think that's consistent with my recollection. Again, I don't have access to that.
KELLY: Was there -- was there any mention, Ms. Gabbard, of a weapon or weapons system?
GABBARD: I don't recall specific weapons systems being named.
KELLY: I'm not talking about specific any, weapon or weapons system.
GABBARD: I don't recall specific names of systems or weapons being used or named within the chat.
KELLY: Well, I'm not asking whether -- I -- I don't want you to tell me what the specific weapon was, but any weapon at all.
Mr. Ratcliffe, same question.
RATCLIFFE: I don't recall.
KELLY: How about anything about timing? Ms. Gabbard?
GABBARD: I don't recall specific timing. But I won't...
KELLY: Was there any mention...
GABBARD: I won't get into the detail of -- of the conversation, but obviously, there was a significant amount of planning and internal
discussions that had occurred prior to and outside of this Signal chat.
KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe, you're nodding your head. Any mention of any military unit whatsoever? Mr. Ratcliffe?
RATCLIFFE: Not that I recall.
KELLY: Ms. Gabbard?
GABBARD: Not that I recall.
KELLY: OK, so I understand that DOD policy prohibits discussion of even what is called controlled unclassified information, or CUI, on unsecured
devices. Are both of you aware of that DOD policy?
GABBARD: I haven't read that policy.
RATCLIFFE: I'm not familiar with the DOD policy, but I would say that the secretary of defense is the original classification authority for DOD in
deciding what would be classified information.
[11:45:04]
KELLY: Ms. Gabbard, does the intelligence community have a policy that prohibits discussion of controlled unclassified information?
GABBARD: Yes.
KELLY: It does, OK. Controlled unclassified information according to DOD includes information that is -- information that has not been approved for
public release. Would you -- of what's been disclosed publicly of the Signal chain, would -- would either of you feel that that would be approved
for public release? Ms. Gabbard?
GABBARD: The discussion that took place in that Signal chat group was a -- a conversation reflecting national security leaders and the vice president
around the president's objectives.
KELLY: So yes or no, would you approve that for public release?
GABBARD: I don't feel I can answer that question here.
KELLY: Because of the nature of this hearing?
GABBARD: Because of -- because of the nature of a private discussion that took place between individual leaders in our government.
KELLY: It would make sense that you would not approve it for public release, wouldn't it?
GABBARD: There are other factors that I -- that would...
KELLY: OK.
GABBARD: ... go into that consideration.
KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe, yes or no?
RATCLIFFE: I wouldn't approve the release of classified information. Again, as I've said, my understanding is that...
KELLY: I'm not talking about classified information, Mr. Ratcliffe. I'm talking about information that has not been approved for public release.
That is information that is considered controlled unclassified information.
RATCLIFFE: The -- the principles that would've been on that would've been individuals capable of approving that for public release.
KELLY: Do you -- let me -- I've got 20 seconds. The deliberation as to whether or not we should launch a strike on another country, would you
consider that classified information, Ms. Gabbard?
GABBARD: Well, the information was not classified.
KELLY: This is a hu- -- this is no- -- I'm not talking about this; I'm just talking about deliberation as -- from principles as to whether or not we
should launch a strike on another country. Would you consider that classified information? I'm not talking about what happened this week.
GABBARD: There are other factors that would go into determining that classification.
KELLY: Mr. Ratcliffe? The deliberation between principles in our national security apparatus about whether or not to strike another country, would
you consider that -- that to be classified information?
RATCLIFFE: Pre-decisional strike deliberation should be conducted through classified channels.
KELLY: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COTTON: If I may, I just want to return, Mr. Ratcliffe, to your answer there, and part Senator Kelly. It's been raised at several occasions now in
this hearing about whether classified information was discussed in this chat, and I -- I -- you mentioned about the secretary of defense being what
you called, I think, the original classification authority.
RATCLIFFE: Correct. Correct.
COTTON: I -- I think it's important for the public to understand that although you and Director Gabbard are original classification authorities
on many matters, you're not that for all matters that might be classified in the government. Is that right?
RATCLIFFE: That's correct.
COTTON: So if the secretary of state has classified sensitive diplomatic details, that's his authority. If the secretary of energy has classi- --
sensitive classified information about our national laboratories, that's his authority. And -- and the two of you can't speak to other departments
who have their own original classification authority, and which, of course, as Director Gabbard said, ultimately la- -- rest with one person, the
president of the United States. Is that correct?
RATCLIFFE: That's correct.
COTTON: OK. I -- I -- I just wanted to clarify that. It looks like the vice chairman wants to weigh in, as well.
WARNER: Just very briefly. I mean, I think it's strange the audience and the watching public's credibility, if we're talking about timing, packages,
that somehow this would be OK to put out, or just, frankly, senior American officials trashing Europe. I -- I've been around this for a while. This is
not information you generally put out. And the notion there's not even acknowledgment of, "Hey, gosh, we screwed up," is stunning to me. And the
idea somehow -- well, none of this was classified, but we can't talk about it here? You can't have it both ways.
COTTON: I think the witnesses' point is that they can't speak for every official in the government who has original classification authority.
WARNER: Mr. Chairman, I -- I don't -- that's not what we're -- I -- I'm not trying to litigate that.
[11:50:02]
I'm trying to litigate on the face, unless, as Senator Bennet said, this reporter is -- is somehow making this all up -- and I think the White House
has acknowledged that the text chain that he submitted was authentic -- it strains my mind to think -- Mr. Chairman, this strains my mind if -- if the
shoe had been on the other foot, what my colleagues would be saying about this.
And again, we're going to get to the bottom of it. I mean, I -- I appreciate your comments, but you guys have both testified under law.
There's nothing classified in that information. There's nothing -- and since I've not heard any -- either one of you say, "Gosh, we screwed up."
So we'll find out. This is too important to our national security. And again, I know we've got more members to go, so...
COTTON: They -- they testified -- it's my understanding -- correct me if I'm wrong -- that there's no intelligence community classified information.
Is that correct?
RATCLIFFE: That's correct.
COTTON: Mr. Ratcliffe, is that correct?
Director Gabbard?
GABBARD: Yes, Chairman.
(UNKNOWN): Well, again...
WARNER: That's not correct. She said repeatedly there's nothing classified, period -- period. You can't have it both -- and again, we'll see. I cannot
believe this is not going to come out. And if it's not classified, again, we'd ask you to make it -- give it to the public today. I'm sure some --
one of your aides back there have probably got it on paper. If you've got here, it's not classified. Stand by your position. Or is this just one more
example of a careless approach to how we keep our secrets in this administration.
COTTON: With apologies to Senator Moran.
MORAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I want to explore a little bit about Ukraine. And I'll direct this to Director Ratcliffe or Director Kruse.
The ATA assesses that, quote, "the grinding war of attrition," in Ukraine, quote, "will lead to a gradual but steady erosion of Kiev's positions on
the battlefield." Are Ukrainian forces at any significant risk of collapse this year?
RATCLIFFE (?): (inaudible).
KRUSE: Before I turn it over to Director Ratcliffe, I think both sides are working through the equipment that they need the industrial base they need
to support that and the personnel that are required to man all of that equipment and man the front lines. And as we see the battle space in the
various portions whether it's in Kursk whether it's in any of the four Oblasts we see areas where Kyiv will struggle to prevent the slow
attritional grind. We do not see an imminent collapse in any of the Line of Control, battle spaces at this point.
MORAN: And then vice versa. That answers my question, unless you want to add something, Director?
Whatever advantages in manpower and materiel they have, can Russia maintain its operational tempo without significant changes to how it's conducting
the war?
KRUSE: I think our assessment from a military perspective is that Russia has the ability to sustain its campaign longer than Kyiv would. Now when
that timeline hits we do not have an assessment of. But I believe that if this were to go on for more than the remainder of this year both sides
would have a significant challenge maintaining their defense industrial base as well as their operational ops tempo.
MORAN: Longer than this year?
KRUSE: That is correct. And they will each have difficulty at various points throughout the spring, summer, and fall as well.
MORAN: Thank you.
Director Ratcliffe, ATA says continuing the Russia-Ukraine war perpetuates strategic risks to the United States of unintended escalation to large-
scale war and heightened insecurity among NATO allies. What are the strategic risks to the United States, if Russia were to achieve its
maximalist objectives via a peace agreement?
RATCLIFFE: Achieved via peace agreement?
MORAN: Yes.
RATCLIFFE: Well, I think that -- clearly the negotiations that are going on reflect that President Trump is seeking a cessation of the war on terms
that will end the war permanently.
From an intelligence community standpoint, and specifically with regard to CIA assets, we've taken steps to support that, the president's goal of an
enduring peace.
To General Kruse's comments, I agree with his assessment and the -- generally the public assessment, that Russia has the battlefield advantage,
is grinding forward slowly.
I want to comment on that, however, to say, that with regard to the Ukrainian resistance, the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian military have
been underestimated for a period of several years now.
[11:55:04]
And ultimately, I'm convinced from my reflections in observing from an intelligence standpoint, that they will fight with their bare hands if they
have to if they don't have terms that are acceptable to an enduring peace.
Obviously to the point of maximalist goals, President Trump has communicated that he is aware of the dangers of that, of Russia getting
what they want. And I think that the peace talks that are taking place would reflect, if successful, and they are making progress, that both sides
would not get everything that they want and no one's maximalist goals would be achieved.
MORAN: Thank you both.
In the short time I have I'm going to skip a question and ask the -- that I intended to ask but ask the Director of the FBI.
Director, I Chair the Subcommittee that appropriates money for the Department of Justice, including the FBI. It has been our practice that the
FBI Director as well as the Attorney General appear before our Committee each year. And I would want to make certain that you do not foresee any
challenges that I will have in your presence when you come to speak to -- when we invite you to come speak about your budget. I think when we visited
in the office, you made yourself often available, pleased to talk to Congress.
We're getting ready for the Appropriations Process to begin. The budget that the president intends to submit is seemingly months away -- weeks away
-- long weeks away. And we may ask you to come testify about your priorities now or sooner than that. Is that a challenge for you that I to
be aware of?
PATEL: At the -- from the FBI, no. As long as the Department of Justice and the Attorney General are good with it.
MORAN: Thank you.
COTTON: Senator Reed?
REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Ratcliffe, you have repeatedly made the point that there was no classified information contained in any of these discussions that were
reported in the Atlantic Monthly. Is that correct?
RATCLIFFE: No. That's not correct.
So Senator, what I related is that, that any information that was related from my perspective or that I observed from the Intelligence perspective,
was not Classified Information.
With respect to the assertions and the allegations that there was strike packages or targeting information or things that relate to DOD. As I've
pointed out, the Secretary of Defense is the original classification authority for determining whether something is classified or not. And as
I've understood from media reports, the Secretary of Defense has said the information was not classified.
REED: Are you aware that the Secretary of Defense declassified this information prior to the (inaudible).
RATCLIFFE: I'm not.
REED: Director Gabbard, same question. You've said -- you've indicated -- at least the impression I got, was there was no classified information
discussed. Is that correct?
GABBARD: Senator, my answer is the same as the Director of the CIA's.
REED: So the question has to be posed to Secretary Hegseth, whether he declassified the information, and at what point he did declassify it. Do
you agree?
GABBARD: Yes. I defer questions to the secretary of Defense.
REED: OK.
Director Patel, are you conducting an investigation of this -- these discussions and activities?
PATEL: Thank, Senator. As I informed the chair -- the vice chairman on the same question, I found out about this late last night-early this morning,
so I don't have an update for you on that.
REED: Well, thank you. When you get an update we'd appreciate it very much.
PATEL: Yes sir.
REED: Director Gabbard, were you overseas during any parts of these discussions?
GABBARD: Yes, Senator. I was.
REED: Were you using your private phone or public phone for the Signal discussions?
GABBARD: I won't speak to this because it's under review by the National Security Council. Once that review is complete, I'm sure we'll share the
results with the committee.
REED: What is under review? It's a very simple question. Your private phone or officially issued phone?
GABBARD: When that review is complete, I'm sure we'll share the results with the committee.
REED: What is under review? It's a very simple question. Your private phone or officially issued phone? What could be under review?
GABBARD: National Security Council is reviewing all aspects of how this came to be, how the journalist was inadvertently added to the group chat,
and what occurred within that chat across the board.
REED: But -- so you were not going to disclose anything about whether you use the phone.
Director Ratcliffe, there's been indication that the CIA has warned recently, retired personnel about the vulnerabilities of Signal, and other
encrypted messaging applications. If that's the case, why were you discussing these issues on Signal?
[12:00:00]
END
